The Alien and the Public Charge Clauses by Alpert, Leo M.
THE ALIEN AND THE PUBLIC CHARGE CLAUSES
LEO M. ALPERT t
"These questions have faced us before; in our generation they
have come before us continuously since the War. Russians, Ar-
menians, Greeks and others have succeeded one another as the
refugee begging consideration and a home. Today it is the German.
Tomorrow it may be the Spaniard. After that, who? Ours must be
a policy based on understanding and appraisal, devoid of emotional-
ism and partisanship."
FIELDS, The Refugee in the United States
TRADITIONALLY, the United States of America has considered itself
a haven of refuge for the oppressed of other lands. That this huniani-
tarian tradition fitted the economic needs of an expanding country has
been regarded by some as a happily providential coincidence and by others
as signal hypocrisy. But with episodic economic crises stripping native
born and resident alien millions of their livelihood, the tradition of asylum
began to fade. When the making in Europe of what is known as "history"
caused "mass immigration" 1 of those who took seriously the words on
the base of the Statue of Liberty, the two attitudes were brought into
even sharper opposition. So it is that today one of the bogeymen haunt-
ing these immigrants and the organizations assisting them emanates from
the "public charge" clauses of Sections 3 and 19 of the Immigration Act.
Section 3 ungrammatically excludes from admission into the United
States "persons likely to become a public charge;"' 2 Section 19 would
I Member of Maryland Bar. Acknowledgements are due Louise A. Alpert, now of
the Refugee Adjustment Committee, Inc., of Baltimore, Maryland, for suggestions, aid,
and insight concerning many of the problems created by the public charge clauses, Tie
conclusions, however, are the writer's responsibility.
1. The common opinion of "mass immigration," a horde of aliens clamoring for
entry into the United States and inundating it, is not at one with the facts, The quota
for all countries, as fixed by President Hoover's Proclamation of March 22, 1929, is
153,714 immigrants a year. The number of immigrants actually admitted under the quota
each year, beginning with 1931 and ending through 1938, is: 51,153; 12,022; 7,634;
11,719; 16,325; 17,732; 26,654; 42,685. See FIELDS, THE REFUGEE IN THE UNITED SrATEs
(1938) 9, 20-21; AmmlicAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, REFUGEE FaCTs (1939) 6-7, It
is stated in the latter pamphlet that, for the six years from July 1, 1932, through June 30,
1938, 241,962 immigrants were admitted to the United States for permanent residence and
that, in the same period 246,449 immigrants previously admitted to the United States for
permanent residence moved away. With respect to Nazi Germany, however, there has been
an increase. German immigrants in the six and a half years from July 1, 1932, through
December 30, 1938, totalled 65,404; during the same period, 22,362 aliens in this country
left for Germany. Thus in the six and one-half years, there has been an increase of
43,042 German aliens, an average per annum of 6,622. This is so small a number that the
clamor is either plain foolishness or vicious talk.
2. 39 STAT. 875 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 136 (1934).
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deport those aliens who, within five years after entry, become public
charges "from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent
to landing."3 The two clauses must be carefully discriminated.
Section 3 deals with inadmissibility of an alien at time of attempted
entry; such inadmissible aliens who nevertheless enter this country may
be deported only if taken into custody within five years of entry." Section
19 may be invoked at any time and any alien deported who, within five
years of entry, actually becomes a public charge.'
The word "entry," by way of further scene setting, is literally construed.
Any return to the United States, be the departure ever so slight, is an
"entry."" The reports are spangled with cases in which the Immigration
Service has forced this accepted judicial attitude in order to deport an
alien who, at time of original entry, was inadmissible but somehow got
into the country, stayed over five years - hence could not be deported
-and then visited Canada or Mexico, or sailed on a ship touching a
foreign port, or went from one point in the United States to another
on a train which wandered over the border and back, to be seized on
"return" by the Service which is remarkably astute in such matters
The same activity is manifested in cases where the alien at time of
original entry was admissible but would not be permitted to reEnter the
country if he left; and the visit to Canada. to Mexico, or the touching
at a foreign port, or the unknown train crossing, is uniformly held a
departure not entitling the alien to return to this land of freedom and
opportunity.8
3. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1934).
4. CooK AND HAGERTY, IMMIGRATION Lws OF THE U111TED ST,Ts (1929) §233.
5. Ibid.
6. There is some dispute in the cases, depending on the facts, but with that caveat
the statement as made is correct. United States ex rcL. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 4_2,
425 (1933); United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 393 (1929); Zurbricl= v.
Woodhead, 90 F. (2d) 991, 991 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937): "Once more xe are impelled to
direct attention to the toll in human anguish which so often follows that literal reading
of the Immigration Act by which every departure from the United States, however brief
and temporary, and pursuant to no intention to relinquish domicile, constitutes subsequent
return a new entry, subjecting the unsuspecting to exclusion or deportation." Schmucl:er
v. Martinez, 37 F. (2d) 315, 316 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
7. Hansen v. Haff, 291 U. S. 559 (1934) ; see note 6, supra, and Zurbrick v. Borg,
47 F. (2d) 690 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); United States v. Williams, 187 Fed. 470 (S. D.
N. Y., 1911).
S. United States cx reL Medich v. Burmnaster, 24 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923);
Guimond v. Howes, 9 F. (2d) 412 (S. D. Me., 1925); Ex parte Horn, 292 Fed. 455
(N. D. Wash., 1923) ; Ex parte Fragoso, 11 F. (2d) 938 (S. D. Calif., 1926) ; Ex parie
Rodriguez, 15 F. (2d) 878 (S. D. Te:., 1926); United States ex rel. Lehtola v. Magic,
47 F. (2d) 763 (D. Minn., 1931) and cases cited supra notes 6 and 7.
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I.
WHo Is A PUBLIC CHARGE?
and, without in the least intending necessarily to impose
such a sociological purpose upon the classification of Congress, I
believe that the statute should be reasonably construed . "
Judge Learned Hand
"Public charge" has been defined as any maintenance or financial
assistance rendered from public funds or funds secured by taxation.0 "It
does not mean the acceptance of charitable help of any individual or
organization when such funds are secured by voluntary contributions,
or for maintenance in any institution supported by donations and not
receiving a part or all of its support from public (tax) funds."10
The phrase is ringed with the emotional aura of paupers and charity
and almshouses, but, despite the brave statement above, the federal courts,
on at least one point, are in a most violent disagreement unalloyed as
yet by the Supreme Court.
The Alien Who Has Served A Jail Term?
The major battle of the circuits is over this question: whether an alien,
sentenced to jail here, who must perforce, for the period of his incar-
ceration, be maintained by the state out of public funds, is thereby a
public charge. To the alien, the importance of the answer need hardly
be stated. A chance encounter with Blue Laws, with a roadside Justice
of the Peace operating a speed trap, are but minor instances of the ease
with which entry into jail may be effected.
In the First Circuit, the District Court for Massachusetts, without
passing directly upon the question, expressed doubt anent the soundness
of an affirmative answer;11 but two later cases, from the District Court
for Maine, in 1925 and 1926, seemed to feel an affirmative answer was
correct.-
2
Probably this was influenced by one of the earliest cases on the point,
a New York district court decision in 1910 which held flatly that inmates
of prisons "were surely public charges, at least during the terms of their
incarceration." 1 Some seven years later, however, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit took the contrary view:
9. CooK AND HAGERTY, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1929) § 285.
10. Ibid.
11. Ex parte Costarelli, 295 Fed. 217 (D. Mass., 1924).
12. Ex parte Riley, 17 F. (2d) 646 (N. D. Me., 1926); Guimond v. Howes, 9 F.
(2d) 412 (S. D. Me., 1925).
13. United States ex rel. Freeman v. Williams, 175 Fed. 274, 275 (S. D. N. Y.,
1910).
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"Ve are convinced that Congress meant under the act to exclude
persons who were likely to become occupants of almshouses for want
of means with which to support themselves in the future. If the
word covered jails, hospitals, and insane asylums, several of the
other categories of exclusion [which specifically deal with such sub-
jects' 4] would seem to be unnecessary."'' xr
The New York district, nonetheless, followed its former ruling with
bland unconcern,:' and even seemed to have affected the circuit courtI
until that court spoke to the question again in 1929.18 "The language
. ," said Judge Learned Hand, referring to the public charge statute,
"suggests rather dependency than imprisonment.'"9
In the remaining circuits where the question has arisen, the decisions
are equally and hopelessly conflicting, 0 so that until the Supreme Court
has spoken, and possibly even after, the alien's rights, to put it vulgarly,
14. In addition to the public charge clauses the Statute contains these: "idiots,'
"imbeciles," "epileptics," "insane persons," "professional beggars," "vagrants," "prosti-
tutes," aliens sentenced to prison for a specified term for a crime involving moral turpi-
tude, and a host of other categories of exclusion and deportation.
15. Howe v. United States ox rel. Savitsky, 247 Fed. 292, 294 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
16. Ex parte Mitchell, 256 Fed. 229 (N. D. N. Y., 1919 ).
17. United States ex rel. Mantler v. Comm'r, 3 F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924);
Wallis v. United States ex ref. Mannara, 273 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
18. United States ex rcL Iorio v. Day, 34 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
19. Id. United States cx ref. Iorio v. Day, 34 F. (2d) 920, 922 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
20. The Third, Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have not had occasion to decide
the question. In the Fifth Circuit, a District Court case by implication took the affirma-
tive. Ex parte Rodriguez, 15 F. (2d) 878 (S. D. Tex., 1926). But the Circuit Court,
one year later, in 1927, said emphatically that public charge cannot be supposed to refer
to anything other than "a condition of dependence on the public for support. Nothing
in the act indicates that in using the words in question the lawmakers had in mind the
subject of criminal misconduct or the consequences thereof." Covkendall v. Skrmetta, 22
F. (2d) 120, 121 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927). The Sixth Circuit in an early case took the view
of the New York District Court that "inmates of jails and prisons are for the time being
public charges." Sam Fung Yen v. Frick, 233 Fed. 393, 396 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916), cert.
denied, 242 U. S. 642 (1916). Then, in 1930, without actually overruling its former viev.,
the court held the principle inapplicable to the particular case before it and went on to say
that the negative answer to the question was supported by the better authority and the
stronger reason. Brown v. Zurbrick, 45 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930). The Eighth
Circuit has consistently, if such a word can be used to refer to only two cases, upheld the
affirmative of the question. United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F. (2d) 57
(C. C. A. Sth, 1928) ; United States cx re. Lehtola v. Magie, 47 F. (2d) 769 (D. linn.,
1931). The Ninth Circuit presents the amusing spectacle of the circuit court standing
on the negative, Ng Fung Ho v. White, 266 Fed. 765 (C. C.A. 9th, 1920), cert. grautcd,
254 U. S. 628 (1920), affirmed in part and reversed in part without consideration 4 ttie
public charge issue, 259 U. S. 276 (1922), with all the later district court decisions, for
Washington and California, taking the affirmative. Ex parte Tsunetaro Machida, 277 Fed.
239 (A. D. Wash., 1921) ; Ex parte Horn, 292 Fed. 455 (NV. D. W\ash., 1923) ; Hrz parto
Reeves, 292 Fed. 766 (V. D. Wash., 1923) ; E parte Britten, 293 FLd. 61 (W. D. Wash.,
1923) ; Ex parte Fragoso, 11 F. (2d) 988 (S. D. Calif., 1920).
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will turn upon the place where he is caught by the Immigration Service.
There is nonetheless discernible a trend toward removing criminal mis-
conduct from the public charge category.2" But that may be cold comfort
to the deported Arkansas alien, for example, who sees his fellow in
Mississippi, just across the state line, go off scot-free under a federal
statute supposed to be operating uniformly over the states. A disquisition
on the American system of laws and government should then be of
consuming awe to the alien.
What Is Public Assistance?
Until the mid nineteen-thirties a prevailing climate of opinion con-
sidered relief a degrading charity. Relief today is still felt to be some
excrescence on the social order but nonetheless a responsibility and duty
of society. With this growth of attitude the function has been expanded.
It is now because of the diversity in the types of public assistance that
the public charge spectre is so fearsome. The difficulties illustrate the
frequent clash between society in flux and law in hysteresis. The
society of 1939 is here controlled by a set of statutes which have not
been thoroughly examined, judging by their motley physical appearance,
since 1924; and piecemeal added to or altered since that time. The social
drives of 1939 bear the same relationship to those of 1924 as an adolescent
to a mewling infant.
Even so it is curious that the reports are so singularly sparse of cases
dealing directly with the general statement that aliens supported in whole
or in part by public (tax) funds are deportable as public charges. The
facts in Guimond v. Howes22 showed a Canadian alien husband in jail
for liquor law violations with his alien wife and citizen (by birth) chil-
dren being cared for by the township in which the family had lived for
years. Ex parte Turner23 involved an alien Canadian supported by
"charitable relief" while her husband was a free hospital patient. it re
Osterloh24 dealt with a German girl living at the Gulf Coast Home,
apparently a charitable institution for those young ladies who are more
to be pitied than censured. In none of these cases, though the ground is
clear, was the public charge clause applied. Only in two more recent
decisions was deportation ordered squarely upon the fact that the aliens
were supported by "welfare relief."2 And today, to return to the question
21. See Comment, Statutory Construction in Deportation Cases (1931) 40 YALt
L. J. 1283, 1292.
22. 9 F. (2d) 412 (S. D. Me., 1925).
23. 10 F. (2d) 816 (S. D. Calif., 1926), motion for leave to file habeas corpus and
proceed in forma pauperis denied, 275 U. S. 484 (1927).
24. 34 F. (2d) 223 (S. D. Tex., 1929).
25. Ex parte Nunez, 93 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), rev'g, 18 F. Supp. 1007
(S. D. Calif., 1937); United States ex rel. Matterazza v. Fogarty, 13 F. Supp. 403
(W. D. N. Y., 1936).
[Vol. 49: 18
ALIEN AND PUBLIC CHARGE CLAUSES
of what is public assistance, such relief is just one facet of a many-sided
social program.
Over the forty-eight states is spread a federal plan, administered by
the states which also contribute funds, of aid to the blind, old age pen-
sions, aid to dependent children, public health, and employment services.
In almost every state there is state and local general public assistance
(which goes by many different names: welfare relief, home relief, and
so on), free hospital care, and dispensary serice; there are state insti-
tutions for the tuberculous, the insane, the mentally defective; children's
institutions for the feeble-minded, children's and adults' convalescent
homes, state or local hospitals for infectious diseases, and state and local
public health services.
In addition, for the employable destitute, there is the Works Progress
Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the National Youth
Administration. Public Works Administration is operated on a basis of
merit rather than need -the need being considered only in relation to
the municipalities seeking grants of P.V.A. funds- but might also be
here included as bearing on the question of what type of public assistance
will render an alien deportable. The recent changes in the law denying
aliens any share in W.P.A. and PAV.A.20 does not affect the importance
of treating those agencies, because it has been estimated that over 45,000
aliens were on AV.P.A. alone before the change27 and many may have
been in the United States less than five years.
It is the type of relief today usually called general public assistance,
welfare relief, or home relief, that is the modem counterpart of the pau-
per, almshouse and charity concept. Many of the states have no citizen-
ship qualifications for this relief although a varying length of residence
within the state is required. Destitution is the basis of the grant, with
varying restrictions on employability.
Even without the authority of the two cases holding deportable an
alien supported by such a grant, the conclusion is inescapable that ac-
ceptance of this type of relief by an alien with less than five years
residence within the United States would render him deportable as a
public charge (subject to the proviso regarding a cause subsequent to
landing). In general, this circumstance is clearly covered under present
law though there may arise a number of perplexing cases.
For example, suppose a family on relief is composed of a citizen
father, an alien mother, and alien children; or an alien father and mother
and citizen (by birth) children; or some other of the possible combina-
tions. Necessarily the alien members of the family also live on the relief
monies. Are they deportable as public charges for receiving public funds?
26. 84 Cong. Rec., Jan. 13, 1939, at 465; see Alien Legislation (1939) 7 ThT. Juno. A.
Bu.L. 126.
27. Alien Legislation (1939) 7 Ih'r. JumD. A. But. 126.
1939]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Since relief monies are budgeted to applicants on the size of the family
unit, it would follow that, in practical effect, it is the aliens who are also
applicants for, and recipients of, the public funds. There might seem
a logical contradiction in the fact that the citizen husband is under a duty
to support his family and hence an alien wife's insistence that the duty
be performed should not cause deportation. This contradiction is not
real. At bottom, since the amount given to the head of the family is
determined by the size of the family, the aliens are direct recipients of
the public relief. The point was not discussed in United States ex ..
Matterazza v. Fogarty"' but that case may be taken as authority for
the stand. There the alien wife and citizen husband had unsuccessfully
applied to the city of Rochester for relief twice in 1933 and twice in
1934. On the wife's return, later in 1934, from Italy, whence she had
gone to bring back her son, born in Italy of her previous marriage to
an Italian, she found her husband in jail charged with receiving stolen
goods. She and the boy were then supported by the department of wel-
fare of the city. A finding by the Immigration Service that she and the
boy were inadmissible as likely to become public charges was sustained
by the court.
Indeed, the courts have gone even further. An alien mother was
ordered deported, though her three minor children were citizens by birth,
because she had lived on the relief monies allotted to her and the chil-
dren.2 ' The district court had written a strong opinion against deporta-
tion by arguing that the children were the major beneficiaries of the
public funds, that sound public policy, based on the welfare of American
children, demanded the mother's presence, and that, if the mother were
deported, someone else would have to look after the children anyhow."0
But the sound sense of this decision was overruled by the pundits on
the circuit court.
A consideration now of the other types of public assistance, beginning
with that kind which least presents a ground for deportation, raises the
question of the Public Works Administration.
Since P.W.A. funds go to cities or states showing need and are not
calculated on the need of the individual employee- but on his merit -
there would seem to be little doubt that an alien who has worked for
P.W.A. is not a public charge. There have been no cases on this point
but the .reasoning is clear enough.
A similarly clear situation is that of an alien child using public school
facilities. Again no reported cases appear, but since education of the
resident alien child is a matter of governmental concern, compulsory in
28. 13 F. Supp. 403 (W. D. N. Y., 1936).
29. In re Nunez, 93 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
30. In re Nunez, 18 F. Supp. 1007 (S. D. Calif., 1937).
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most states, there is no question on attendance at such schools not being
a ground for deportation.
A diverting parenthesis bolstering this position is the case of the
resident alien boy accompanying his school class on a visit to Canada and
on return being seized by the Immigration Service. Under habeas corpus
the child was released, because, said a judge obliged to sharp-shoot his
way through the entry cases - which supported the argument of the
Service -the boy was obliged by law to go to school and was therefore
compelled to accompany his class on pain of becoming a truant. Hence
he could not be said to have left the country. The underlying basis of
the entry cases is that of voluntary departure; this boy had been required
to leave." If the element of compulsion - which. in the public school
situation is a short-hand expression for the idea that minor persons
resident in the United States must be trained to become useful members
of society-is carried so far in an entry case, there is little reason to
suppose that the use of public school facilities would render the public
charge clause operative.
This broad statement is complicated, nevertheless, by the existence of
special classes and special schools for the "retarded" and defective child.
The transfer of an alien child from the usual classes in - say - Public
School 67 to a special class in the school for the "retarded" pupils should
not, in reason, and probably would not, cause the child to fall into the
public charge category. But suppose the alien child is now moved one
more step: from the special class to a state or city school for defective
children. Is the child now a public charge?
The decision in Nocchi v. Johnson -32 answered the question in the nega-
tive, but on a point entirely different from the one that might have been
expected. judge Anderson turned his opinion by arguing that since the
parents were financially able to pay the costs at the Wrentham State
School for Defective Children, and were duty bound to educate and
maintain their boy, failure of the parents to pay and failure of the state
to enforce payment did not, as a matter of law, make the boy a public
charge. The state had not made a demand upon the parents to pay; their
failure to do so, therefore, was not voluntary and hence was not an
"acceptance" of public aid. This. say commentators, is the usual rule in
hospital deportations.'
The School for Defective Children situation is thus here analogized to
the hospital cases, which will be dealt with shortly as another type of
31. United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, 1 F. Supp. 370, 373 (N. D. N. Y.,
1932).
32. Nocchi v. Johnson, 6 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925).
33. See Cooi AND HAGEMTY, Im IRIAT .o LAWiS or THI UziTa STATEs (1929)
§ 286.
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public assistance. For the aptness of the analogy is questionable, and the
failure to discriminate between the two kinds of cases may be dangerous.
First, there are many different schools for defective children: some
are purely custodial institutions and so, in function, do resemble hospi-
tals; others are schools in the highest and best sense of the word, training
the child to make use of his limited abilities usually through instruction
in the manual trades. The Wrentham School in Nocchi v. Johnson was,
in fact, a real school of that latter kind and the alien boy was not so
feeble-minded that he would have been unable to learn a trade and make
a living at it.
Second, the rights involved in the school cases are those of the alien
child. "It must not be overlooked," said Judge Anderson, "that the rights
we are now dealing with are the rights of this boy. It was the legal duty
of his parents, being able, to support and educate him. It was also the
duty of the officers of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to collect
proper charges for his support and training in the Wrentham School,
even if the parents were unwilling to pay these charges. Failure by his
parents, or by the officers, or by both, in this duty does not subject the
boy to the penalty of deportation."' 34
The first point of difference between the school and the hospital cases,
however, would not seem to change the operation of the law. The
existence of special schools for children ineligible for ordinary public
schools necessitates only the further inquiry of whether the facilities
are charged for or are free. If free, there is no difficulty. If charged
for, the fact that such schools perform the function of the ordinary
public schools does not alter the fact that an alien child attending the
special school is an expense to the state. But the second point of differ-
ence - that it is the rights of the child which are involved - does, under
the rule of Nocchi v. Johnson, enunciate a different principle: that the
child is a public charge only if the parents are financially unable to pay
the special costs. This liberal rule rings true because the training of
the alien child to become a possibly useful citizen may be, to the state,
worth the added administrative trouble of ascertaining whether the parents
are financially responsible, instead of simply taking the fact for granted
that the alien child at the special school is a public charge when the parents
have not paid the expenses.
That reasoning is equally applicable to the hospital cases in which an
alien child is the free patient.
Omitting an early New York district case which held deportable an
Italian adult, who, after spending over $1,500 for private medical ser-
vices, was obliged to become a charity patient at Bellevue and was in-
formed on by an enemy,"5 the case of Ex parte Kichmniriantz is next
34. Nocchi v. Johnson, 6 F. (2d) 1, 2 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925).
35. United States ex rel. Canfora v. Williams, 186 Fed. 354 (S. D. N. Y., 1911).
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presented. 6 There a young Armenian, committed to the state insane asy-
lum, was held not deportable as a public charge. If, said District Judge
Dooling cryptically, mere detention in a state hospital makes a person
a public charge without consideration of the question whether or not
the person is actually a public charge, then the order of deportation must
be sustained. But, the judge continued, the law of California imposed
the cost of maintaining an insane person on his estate and parents: "I
am of the opinion that the words 'public charge' . . . mean just what
they mean ordinarily: that is to say, a money charge upon, or an expense
to, the public for support and care; and when the state receives from
the relatives what it has fixed as an adequate compensation for such
support, I do not think the individual so cared for is a public charge,
within the meaning of the act." 37  From this, judge Dooling erected
the presumption that, in the absence of an affirmative showing to the
contrary, it must be presumed that the costs were borne by the legally
responsible persons.
Though this presumption can hardly be said to be the "law," the trend
is toward examination of the circumstances under whicl the alien became
an inmate of a public institution. If the state received payment for its
services as billed, though not the equivalent to the state of the cost, the
public charge clause is held inoperative.s If no billing was made, but
the alien's relatives were willing to pay all along, the public charge clause
again will not be applied,3 although this is not the weight of authority.
On the basis of the trend it might be hazarded that unless billing has
been made and payment refused the alien will not be held a public charge.
Certainly this is a far more reasonable doctrine than the older one
requiring the alien's relatives to take the initiative in asking for the
hospital bills, although at present it is still a minority rule. Indeed, the
36. 283 Fed. 697 (N. D. Calif., 1922).
37. Ex par!e Kichmiriantz, 2R3 Fed. 697, 693 (N. D. Calif., 1922).
38. United States ex tel. Brugnoli v. Tod, 300 Fed. 913 (S. D. N. Y., 1923), aff'd.
300 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) on the ground that there %was a lac of medical evi-
dence that the psychosis from which the alien was suffering and for which she had Laen
institutionalized could not have arisen subsequent to landing. Cf. United Stats cx rel.
Mandel v. Day, 19 F. (2d) 520 (E. D. N. Y., 1927). Ex parle Orzcchowslm, 23 F. Sup1p.
428 (D. Ore., 1938) involved an alien girl whose prosperous uncles left money at the
state hospital for her upkeep but not enough to cover the full costs of the girl's care;
on the uncles' testimony that such failure v.'as due to a misunderstanding and that they
were illing to pay all past and future charges, the habeas corpus writ was granted.
39. United States ex i'L Donatello v. Comm'r, 4 F. (2d) 80S (E. D. N. Y., 1925),
rev'd on rearguiment, 8 F. (2d) 362 (E. D. N. Y., 1925), on the ground of mental ca-
dition at time of entry; Ex parte Orzechowska, 23 F. Supp. 423 (D. Ore., 1933) ; see
also United States ex tel. Haft v. Tod, 300 Fed. 917 (S. D. N. Y., 1933), aftid, 390 Fed.
918, 918 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), where the judge dismissed the writ of habeas corpus on
the ground that the alien was inadmissible at time of entry because of his mental condi-
tion.
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confusion of these cases resembles the "law" applicable to the imprisoned
alien.
Whether tender of payment after deportation proceedings have begun
should be held to stop the execution of the warrant is a debatable issue.
Vith logic, it is stated that in fact the alien has become a public charge
and so must be deported.4" This is a harsh and literal logic. It is
equally applicable to the situation above where the hospital does not ask
for payment and the relatives do not offer payment, though they are
quite willing to pay if asked. Yet the logic is not literally applied there.
A more equitable enforcement of present law, safeguarding equally as
well the interested community, would be the requirement of an investi-
gation to ascertain the financial standing of the relatives, to learn whether
past failure to pay was due to mistake or misunderstanding, and possibly
to require that a public charge bond be posted. The purpose of the Immi-
gration Laws is not really to avenge by deportation the acceptance of
public care - although this seems to be the emotional level upon which
the cases are litigated - but to protect the state. Until that purpose is
acknowledged and the emotional attitude so shifted, it would appear that
harsh and literal logic will continue to be the prevailing doctrine.
The principal types of public assistance have now been considered;
other less important types are fitted rather obviously into one of these
categories. It is therefore apposite to turn to the clause in the statute
saving from deportation an alien who has become a public charge if he
makes an affirmative showing that the cause for his status arose after
his landing in the United States.
Cause Subsequent To Entry
Causality, in philosophy as in law, is a messy business. The accident,
disease, and mental defect cases, because of a fairly well developed medical
skill in etiology, present a method of approach.
In the case of the alien hit on the head by a brick, or run over by a
train, the facts of themselves, to use a handy phrase, establish a cause
subsequent to entry for the alien's free care at a hospital. Fairly clear
also are those cases in which a slowly developing disease, such as tra-
coma,41 has a causality definite enough in point of time for a surgeon
to state within reason the date of onset. In many of the dementia praecox
cases physicians have asserted that the disease had its beginning in youth,
and, on the basis of the particular clinical history, have diagnosed it as
40. See pp. 25-26, supra.
41. In Hughes v. United States ex rel. Licata, 295 Fed. 800 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924), a
surgeon's certificate that an entry-seeking alien had tracoma was held insufficient for the
stated reason that tracoma develops slowly and hence if the alien had tracoma at the
time of landing she must have had it at the time of embarcation, and this last was denied
in the certificate.
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chronic, due to conditions existing prior to landing."2 The mental cases
are difficult to generalize because of the almost invariable inclusion of
the separate complaint under the Immigration Laws that the alien was
a person of "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" at time of entry.4 3
Under this complaint it is for the Immigration Service to prove affirna-
tively the existence of the mental condition at the time of landing,"
although with respect to the public charge clause it is for the alien to
show affirmatively that the cause therefor arose after landing. The
shifting of the evidentiary burdens in the cases where both complaints
are preferred by the Service makes the decisions hard to construe. In
addition, the psychoses are delicate concepts for handling, as is made
manifest by Ex parte La Matina4' and United Slates ex rel. Powlowcec
v. Day.4
6
In the first case, an Italian alien had entered the United States in 1909
and had left in 1915 to fight for his country in the World War. On his
return to this country in 1920 he was at once committed to a state
42. Ex parte Kichmiriantz, 2,3 Fed. 697 (N. D. Calif., 1922) ; United States ex rcl.
Brugnoli v. Tod, 300 Fed. 913 (S. D. N. Y., 1923), aff'd (for lack of evidence that
psychosis could not have arisen subsequent to landing), 300 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 24,
1924); United States ex rel. Haft v. Tod. 300 Fed. 917 (S. D. N. Y.. 1923), aftd, 360
Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 2d, 192-4); E.r parte La Matina, o F. (2d) 468 (D. Conn., 195);
United States ex rel Romanow Y. Flnn. 17 F. (2d) 378 (W. D. N. Y., 1927 ; United
States ex rel Powlowec v. Day, 33 F. (2d) 2o7 (C. C. A. 2d. 1924 1.
43. See cases cited supra note 42 and see United States ex rel. Casimano v. Commr,
15 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); United States ex retl. Mandel v. Day, 19 F. (2d)
520 (E. D. N. Y., 1927); United States e.r rel. Paolantinit, v. Day, -. F. (2d) 914
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Foley ex rel. Schenck v. Ward. 13 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass., 1935);
Ex parte Orzechowska, 23 F. Supp. 428 D. Ore.. 1938. The "constitutional psycho-
pathic inferiority" clause is contained in Section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39
STAT. 875 (1917), 8 U. S.'C. § 136 (1934).
44. United States ex rel. Brugnoli v. Tod, 300 Fed. 913 (S. D. X. Y., 1923), off'd,
300 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); United States .- rel. Casimano v. Comm'r, 15 F.
(2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); United States c.r reL Romanow v. Flynn, 17 F. (2d) 373
(AV. D. N. Y., 1927). In United States cx rel. Mandel v. Day, 19 F. t2d) 520, 52- (E.
D. N. Y., 1927), the court said: "The rule of this. circuit is that, in the case of any
alien ordered deported on the ground that at the time o-f his entry he was a person of
constitutional psychopathic inferiority, the record must contain evidence as to the pre-
vious mental or medical history of the alien. Accordingly, where no reasons whatever
are assigned through or by virtue of which the decision was arrived at, the conclusion
is that the cause of the alien's psychosis could not have arisen subsequent to landing, and
the court will refuse to uphold the action of the immigration authorities:' United States
ex reL Powlowec v. Day, 33 F. (2d) 267, 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) overruled the doc-
trine of Brugno l v. Tod which required the clinical history, indicating that the alien .%-as
insane on arrival, to be based on an examination of the alien, or on the alien's past his-
tory, when not deranged. The new doctrine is that a history based on tile alien's conduct
when actively deranged is sufficient, other facts being probative, to shw that the alien
was insane on arrival.
45. 6 F. (2d) 468 (D. Conn., 1925).
46. 33 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
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hospital in Connecticut for dementia praecox. One of his brothers was
there with the same ailment. Deportation was sustained under the public
charge clause on the ground that the disease was constitutionally heredi-
tary, even though excitement might hasten its onset. Is it or not a fair
psychiatrical statement that this individual might have lived his whole
life through as a relatively normal person had it not been for the unusual
stress of war? What kind of unusual stress, then, occurring within the
United States might not also send an immigrant to a state hospital with
dementia praecox or some other mental condition?
In the second case, a twenty-three year old Pole, who had entered in
1922, was sent to an insane asylum not quite four years later where his
condition was diagnosed as "dementia praecox, hebephrenic." After a
six months stay at the institution, the alien was discharged in the care
of his brother. After the commitment, the Immigration Service had
issued its warrant charging "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" at
time of entry. During the proceedings, the superintendent of the hospital
changed his diagnosis from "dementia praecox, hebephrenic" to "psy-
chosis with psychopathic personality, discharged November 7, 1927, psy-
chopathic personality- condition recovered." Three health surgeons at
Ellis Island then examined the alien, found him free of mental defects,
and declined to say that he had been suffering from any when he landed.
The superintendent stood by his second diagnosis, and the deputy ex-
aminer of the Service, who had diagnosed "constitutional psychopathic
inferiority," stood by his, saying, what physicians usually will not say,
that the two diagnoses made no real difference, especially in so far as
the clause in the law was concerned. With this point of view Judge
Learned Hand agreed in an opinion which somewhat enlightens the
subject:
"This unhappy man has, so far as we can see, been long detained
over nothing more than a form of words . . . The question is
whether there is any evidence that shows him to have a mental
makeup which falls within the phrase used in the statute. That was
intended to include those who by nature were subject to insanity of
one sort or another; that is to say, whose constitution was such that
they had not normal mental stability. When that is so, their infe-
riority necessarily antedates their arrival here, because it is inherent
in their nervous structure . .. [for this] we must accept the opinion
of those formally qualified. It is enough that they shall be accredited
in the customary way and honestly believe that the alien falls within
the class . . . If this results in too severe a test, and puts the fate
of aliens wholly in the hands of any psychiatrist whom the Secretary
of Labor is willing to accept, the remedy is with Congress. The
whole subject is one of excessive uncertainty at best; whoever is
fitted for the responsibility, it is certain that we are not; we must
act upon what those tell us who carry the proper credentials." 47
47. 33 F. (2d) 267, 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
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The mental defect cases, then, run along the line that aliens "without
normal mental stability," as certified by physicians48 may be held afflicted
with "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" and so deported; or de-
ported as public charges if they accept public hospital assistance within
five years of entry, since the cause, "inherent in their nervous system,"
necessarily antedates their arrival in the United States. Whether this
is sound, in the light of present day psychiatrical and psycho-analytical
knowledge, raises questions too deep and too broad for discussion here,
though, at bottom, the answers should be decisive of the law."A
If disease is so treated, then what of the question of economic stress
and, further, of the not unrelated question of crime?
The case of an alien whose business fails and who is therefore driven
to public relief might appear simple. After all, the individual cannot
control the economic sweeps of a nation. For that reason, possibly, the
late Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled
that alien recipients of public relief would not fall within the interdicted
class." This administrative ruling, however, has not yet been confirmed
by the courts; and since causality is pressed so far in the mental cases,
it might be fatal to rely upon it at all. The failed business man might
have a long record of receiverships and bankruptcies and failures, and
his individual history might show a definite inability to make a living
anywhere. A reductio ad absurdum is not implied, but would such a
man be "without normal economic stability?" And would this lack be
"inherent in his nervous system?" Another Commissioner of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, whose feeling toward aliens was less
lenient, might so rule and order.
48. For the requirements of these certificates see cases cited mspra notes 42, 43, 44.
The shortest statement of the requirement is in United States ex rel. Papa V. Day, 45 F.
(2d) 435 (S. D. N. Y., 1930).
49. This is no place for a brash jump into psychiatry or psychoanalysis. But def-
initely there have been tremendous advances in the fields. WIxAmLt A. WmT, Fo.iv
YEARS OF PSYCHIATRY (1933); MEiC.L PSYCHOLOGY (1931) c. 11; THE PsCHcOr o ncl,
FACTORS IN DIsEAsFL Definitely it is agreed that in every neurosis there is a general
cause lying deep within the personality of everyone and a precipitating cause which may
be almost anything. See THE EDITORS, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, TmH ERvOs BXxI~,,
(1935) 3, 13, 29-30. (The psychoses are major neuroses in which the conflict between
reality and the unconscious, the conflict which results in neuroses, has been resolved in
favor of the unconscious and reality is disregarded by the individual).
50. FIELDS, THE REFUGEE IN THE UNITED STATES (193S) 51: "The Immigration
and Naturalization Service of the United States, through the late Commissioner, Daniel
,V. MacCormack, ruled that receiving public relief did not constitute a basis for claim-
ing that the recipient had become a public charge, in the sense as used in the immigra-
tion laws." Comment, Statutory Construction in Deporlation Cases (1931) 40 YAIn L J.
1283, 1289, n. 27. "Assurance on this point has recently been given in a letter of the Com-
missioner General of Immigration stating that 'where lack of employment is the only fac-
tor which has placed aliens in needy circumstances, they incur no danger of deportation if
they accept charitable aid.' FOREIGN LANGUAGE INFORMATION SERVICE, 8 INTrzru=t=
RELEASE 16 (1931)."
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Some indication of the present view of one court on such a proceeding
may be gleaned from United States ex rel. Mantler v. Commissioner.1
A twenty-three year old alien was employed as a domestic. She had saved
money and was adjusting herself well to the ways of the United States,
so well in fact that she was guilty of improper relations with another
lady's husband, and for that reason was sought to be deported as likely
to become a public charge. The court decided she was not deportable,
and in answer to the argument that she might be sent to jail for adultery
and so was likely to become a public charge, said:
"Such conjecture or speculation would establish a rule that might
endanger the continued residence of any immigrant. An immigrant
might enter the country and be a failure in business or in securing
gainful occupation, and by the same token it might be reasoned that
he or she would be likely to become a public charge. It is possible
that appellant might so demean herself as to come in conflict with
the criminal laws, but we may not say that this is probable." (Italics
supplied) .52
Though here prediction be risky, it is likely that the ordinary and
normal alien whose business fails, or who loses his job, will run no
great danger in accepting public relief; but the alien with a record' of
failures may run a far more serious course.
The problem of crime must next be considered. It is curious that none
of the reported cases holding deportable an alien who serves a prison
term make mention of the cause subsequent to entry proviso in the
statute.53 The plain reason for such silence is that the great majority
of those cases do not involve the public charge clause. Deportation is
there sought on the "likely to become a public charge" ground. But even
in one of the few jail cases turning on the public charge clause, Ex parte
Tsu-netaro Machida 4 the saving proviso was not discussed. It may be
that the Service does not employ the public charge clause in the jail cases
for the very reason that under it the alien would have opportunity to
show that his predicament arose from a cause subsequent to entry. Such
speculation, however, leads away from a more important facet of the
question.
Suppose an alien motorist in a moment of gross inattention kills a
pedestrian, is convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to the penitentiary.
Will the public charge clause operate? On first blush it would seem not.
A strong affirmative showing could be made under those facts that the
cause of the accident was simply such momentary gross carelessness as
might happen to anyone, and hence was a cause arising after the landing
51. 3 F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
52. 3 F. (2d) 234, 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
53. See note 3, supra.
54. 277 Fed. 239 (W. D. Wash., 1921).
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of the alien in the United States. It may be that for fear of such an
argument the Immigration Service, in the case of In re Schiano Di Cola,"
did not prefer the public charge clause against the alien and relied only
on that section of the law providing for deportation of any alien sen-
tenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more in this country
for a crime involving moral turpitude."
That is clear, but will the argument still be effective when the alien
has a past driving record of shocking detail? The pertinent considera-
tions are those raised in the other realms of causality. In addition, there
may also be the question of whether an alien, sentenced to jail for reck-
less driving or for manslaughter, could be deported as falling within the
class of those persons "likely to become a public charge" at time of entry.
That question also arises in the mental defect and economic failure cases.
It is created partly by the vague and comprehensive wording of the
statute - "likely to become a public charge;" partly by an astonishing
inversion of the doctrine of causality - from the fact that the alien after
entry went to jail (or otherwise became a public charge) it is assumed
that at the time of entry he was likely to go to jail (or become a public
charge), the proof for the assumption then being the actual fact; and
partly by the tendency of the Immigration Service to escape the saving
proviso in the public charge statute by preferring instead the "likely to
become a public charge" complaint - which contains no proviso relating
to cause subsequent to landing.
II.
WHO Is LIKELY To BECOME A PuBLIc CHARGE?
"The most that can be said is that he had shown a propensity . .
Judge Learned Hand
This clause is supposed to relate to the status of the alien at the time
of entry. The case of WVallis v. United States cx rel. ManiararT illus-
trates sound operation under it. Two Italian aliens were held inadmissible
for entry because the one, a man of 54, was senile; and the other, a
woman, was suffering from a grave cardiac valvular disease. It is clear
that when the alien has physical defects of a nature that will affect his
or her ability to earn a living, the "likely to become a public charge"
clause fits the situation. Thus, one may agree with the decision in Ex
55. 7 F. Supp. 194 D. R. I., 1934), discussed in OPrENH Emn. REcNT DEVEor-
MENTS IN THE DEPORTATION PRocEss (1938) 36 MIcu. L. REv. 355, 369.
56. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1934). ". . . any alien who is hereafter
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this
country of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." In the instant case the crime was
held not to involve moral turpitude.
57. 273 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
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parte Hosaye Sakaguchi8 that a Japanese woman who had studied
English (though she still had little knowledge of it) and was a graduate
of a school teaching the sewing and arrangement of artificial flowers
could not be held inadmissible as likely to become a public charge, simply
because her proxy husband in this country refused to accept' her and
her brother-in-law was not legally responsible for her support. One may
agree or disagree with Ex parte Rokiyi Tarnbara, 0 which held a deaf
alien inadmissible, even though the testimony showed that he had been
previously employed at a salary of $4 a day and that the manager of
a concern in the United States had offered him a permanent position at
livable wages; and all without denigrating the Immigration Service
or the courts for applying the "likely to become a public charge" clause.
But just what should be done with a mother, admissible by herself,
although necessary for the best care of her inadmissible defective child?00
What should be done with unaccompanied children ;1 or with a widow
without visible means of support and her three year old son;" or with
common laborers;" cause very considerable stretching of the "likely to
58. 277 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922).
59. 292 Fed. 764 (W. D. Wash., 1923).
60. The question was raised in United States ex rel. Duner v. Curran, 10 F. (2d) 38
(C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied, 271 U. S. 663 (1926), but dismissed as moot since
the child had been sent back to Poland with an attendant by the time the case reached
the court. If the parent or parents are inadmissible but the child is not, for all practical
purposes the question of an unaccompanied child is raised. See note 61, inlra.
61. In Greenwood v. Frick, 233 Fed. 629 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916), the court remarked,
obiter, that if the mother were not admitted, there was sufficient uncertainty of contint-
ing support for the eight year old boy from the father to justify a finding that the child
would fall under the "likely to become a public charge clause." In United States ex rel.
Azizian v. Curran, 12 F. (2d) 502 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), the illiterate widowed mother was
ordered excluded for illiteracy and the child was ordered excluded as likely to become a
public charge since the relatives offering to take responsibility (uncles of the child) were
not legally liable for support, the court adding, however, that it was hoped the child
would be permitted to enter the United States under a public charge bond. United States
ex rel. Berman v. Curran, 13 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926), overruled exclusion of two
unaccompanied children, respectively aged 12 and 13, since the evidence showed they were
coming to relatives whose worth was around $315,000. United States ex rel. De Sousa v.
Day, 22 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), overruled exclusion of an unaccompanied boy
who was coming to an uncle because there was no evidence that the promise of the boy's
uncle to support him, though legally unenforceable, was not made in good faith, nor that
the uncle was not financially able to keep his promise. The holdings are, to put it mildly,
not uniform.
62. United States ex rel. Smith v. Curran, 12 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), sus-
tained exclusion, under the "likely to become a public charge" clause, of a widow and
her three year old son on the ground that assistance offered by relatives and friends on
whom the aliens had no legal claim for support was not sufficient, even though one rela-
tive was willing to file a public charge bond.
63. The famous decision on this point is that of Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3 (1915).
Mr. Justice Holmes overruled the exclusion of illiterate Russian laborers by the Immi-
gration Service, which felt that they were likely to become public charges since they
were bound for Portland, Oregon, where industrial conditions were bad. The basis of
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become a public charge" notion. In certain cases, the Service appears
to have gone in for entirely too much stretching in contending that a
healthy skilled workman was inadmissible because he had little money,"
and that young children were inadmissible because they would become
public charges if their parents died."5
These are situations in which a drastic and ill-conceived enforcement
of the laws has been attempted by the Immigration Service, though it
must be remarked that in general the judiciary has behaved quite whole-
somely. But when the Service tries to deport an alien, admissible at the
time of entry, because of something the alien has done several years after
entry, the elastic of cause and effect is snapped.
The cases are painfully ludicrous. They arise under the statutory
language permitting deportation of an alien inadmissible at time of entry
if the alien is taken into custody within five years of landing.0 The
Department of Labor and many courts have apparently considered the
language to mean that anything not nice done by an alien within five
years of his landing may then be employed against him as evidence to
show that at the time of landing the alien was inadmissible, as likely
to become a public charge, regardless of the alien's actual status at the
time he entered the United States. WVhat warrant there is for such a
construction of the statute gives added force to Professor Corwin's
observation that what courts cannot prove they can always decide.
An alien who has committed a crime for which he may be arrested
and jailed in this country may or may not be considered likely to become
a public charge, depending upon what view the particular court will take
of the alien who is actually jailed." Further, the commission of crime
may be taken as evidence showing a likelihood of the alien to become a
public charge, not through imprisonment, but through delinquency- the
habit of not endeavoring to earn an honest living. Both points were
the decision wvas that the "likely to become a public charge" clause occurred in the statute
between "paupers" and "professional beggars" and hence required for exclusion the same
permanent physical fact as was needed to exclude those classes, and not a temporary
overstocking of the labor market. The Immigration Act of 1917 attempted to overcome
this decision by changing the situs of the "likely to become a public charge' clause "in
order to indicate the intention of Congress that aliens shall be excluded upon said ground
for economic as well as other reasons . . ." I MAIo ;A'no LAvs Aim Rumus oF JAM;uAny
1, 1930 (U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1935).
64. Ex parte Sturgess, 13 F. (2d) 624 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), dismissed the contention.
65. See United States ex el. Duner v. Curran, 10 . (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925),
cert. denied, 271 U. S. 663 (1926). The record is destitute of the slightest evidence that
these children were likely to become public charges. "It is true that by the death of their
parents they might become such, but so would any children of like age. It is impossible
that the statute meant to exclude all such children." United States ex rel. Duner v.
Curran, mipra, at 41.
66. See pp. 18-19, supra.
67. See pp. 20-22, supra.
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stressed in United States ex rel. Freeman v. Williams.8 The alien there
had twice been convicted of assault in Great Britain, had been indicted
for larceny from the trial of which he had fled, had committed robberies
in Austria, had sold fake gems in the United States, and habitually con-
sorted with a band of thieves. The court felt that the alien would not
only soon be involved in crimes in the United States but that, even when
not in prison, he would live at the expense of the community. On much
the same theory, there are decisions that aliens addicted to gambling, who
do not engage in honest industry, are deportable as likely to become
public charges at the time of entry.6" With that introduction the absurd
cases are brought into focus.
In one of them, a proceeding to deport a forty-two year old woman,
nurse by trade and preacher by inclination, was actually brought on the
theory that the alien had excited the resentment of a Mrs. S. by living
in the same house with Mr. S. (who had separated from his spouse),
taking bicycle lessons from him, and becoming so familiar with him that
Mrs. S. in her contemplated suit for a separation might include the alien
as a co-respondent, or might sue her for alienation of affections (thus
possibly depriving the alien of her property by a judgment), or might
forward a criminal prosecution against the alien (thus possibly lodging
her in jail). The court, however, refused to put up with this nonsense. 70
In another case, where the alien, though married, stopped at a hotel
with a woman not his wife, occupied the same bed with her, and, as the
court opined, "conclusively did have sexual intercourse with her," de-
portation on the "likely to become a public charge" ground, as well as for
illegal entry, was sustained.7 A similar ruling was enunciated in a
bigamy case. 72
The grating asininity of these holdings was exposed in E.r parte
Costarelli.7  Shortly after an Italian alien had entered this country in
1920, he sent for his wife and two children with whom he lived until 1922
when he deserted, posed as a single man, and married another. Later
he returned; found his legal wife in an insane asylum and his children
in a destitutes' home; confessed all to the bigamous wife who accepted
the children, and then, when the legal wife died, the two were married
and the family began to make the most of a scrambled life. At this
point the ever-alert Immigration Service arrested the man for deporta-
tion on the ground that, although admissible in 1920 when he had entered
68. 175 Fed. 274 (S. D. N. Y., 1910).
69. Lam Fung Yen v. Frick, 233 Fed. 393 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916), cert. denied, 242
U. S. 642 (1916) ; cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 266 Fed. 765 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920), cert.
grantcd, 254 U. S. 628 (1920), aff'd in part and rcv'd in part, 259 U. S. 276 (1922).
70. Ex parte Mitchell, 256 Fed. 229 (N. D. N. Y., 1919).
71. Ex parte Reeves, 292 Fed. 766 (W. D. Wash., 1923).
72. Ex parte Britten, 293 Fed. 61 (W. D. Wash., 1923).
73. 295 Fed. 217 (D. Mass., 1924).
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the United States, he had later committed the crime of bigamy for which
he might be jailed, and therefore at the time of entry in 1920 he was
likely to become a public charge. The court, in an opinion not sharp
enough by half of what it could have been, remarked that the contention
was absurd that by actions subsequent to entry the alien in the case before
it, was, at time of entry, likely to become a public charge. In the same
year, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a similar
stand and refused to deport a twenty-three year old girl because she had,
some time after entry, been guilty of adultery. '
Yet District judge Hutcheson, presumably cognizant of these cases.
refused habeas corpus to a Mexican man and woman who had been ille-
gally living together in Texas for fifteen years.,' This case was slightly
different on the facts, since the Immigration Service had arrested the
aliens as likely to become public charges after one of their frequent trips
from Laredo, Texas to Mexico and back. The learned judge, faced with
the "entry" rulings and with evidence that the man had originally "im-
ported" the woman to live with him, apparently felt impelled to his
decision, although he himself protested against it.70
Of all the cases dealing with the "likely to become a public charge"
clause, the Costarelli decision is almost the only one setting out sharply
the conditions under which that clause should operate. The clause, it
cannot be too strongly emphasized, refers to aliens as of the time they
enter the United States. To pervert the clause, as the Immigration Service
and some courts have done, into holding aliens deportable as of the time
of entry on the ground that after entry they committed a crime, or took
relief, or did other undesirable things, is an unpardonable inversion cut-
ting the statute into paper dolls. Nevertheless, there can be one exception
to this: if actions subsequent to entry show a cause existing prior to
entry, then, plainly, at the time of landing the alien was likely to become
a public charge. And that brings back the question of whether the alien
sentenced to jail for reckless driving or for manslaughter, or whether the
alien who has failed in business, can be deported as a person who was
at the time of entry within the proscribed class.
If the alien's past driving record is clean, there should be no doubt
but that the cause does not reach as far back as the time of entry. If
the alien's record is a spate of offenses, say, with a death or two on it,
the question is honestly debatable. It is equally debatable in the case of
the alien whose business has smashed. If the alien has a long record of
74. United States ex rel. Mantler v. Comm'r, 3 F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
75. Ex parte Rodriguez, 15 F. (2d) 878 (S. D. Te. 1926).
76. Id. at 879. "I cannot refrain from saing. however, that such a literal, drastic,
and harsh application of the law . . . was not, in my opinio n, intended Iy the framers
of it, since under the undisputed facts these persons have been in every resp ct as man
and wife, and would be under the laws of Texas united in a conutmn-law marriage, but
for the legal impediments of their prior marriage."
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failures and is the type of person who has always been, and always will
be, an economic misfit, there may be a very real issue on the "likely to
become a public charge" complaint.
CONCLUSION
"I am sorry, my lords, that my young friend so far forgot him-
self as to treat your lordships with disrespect. He is extremely
penitent, and you will kindly ascribe his unintentional insult to his
ignorance. You will see at once that it did originate in that: he said
he was surprised at the decision of your lordships. Now, if he had
not been very ignorant of what takes place in this Court every day;
had he known your lordships but half so long as I have, he would
not be surprised at anything you did."
John Clerk, later Lord Eldin
The upshot of this matter of the alien and the public charge clauses
is not particularly edifying.
True, changes within and without the present statutes are necessary.
Outside of the legislation now on the books, the tangled state of the law
on imprisoned aliens might be straightened. Within the statutes, amend-
ments to clarify what is meant by public charge, who are public charges,
what is public assistance, are exigent. Within the statutes; amendments
to crystallize the vagueness of "likely to become a public charge," to
remove the asinine use of that phrase in cases where the actions com-
plained of occurred years after entry and bore no relation to the status
of the alien at the time of entry, to prevent application of the "likely
to become a public charge" clause in cases where the public charge
section is sought to be avoided because of the saving proviso there; all
these are pressing necessities, but, even if achieved, might still be fruitless.
For the motto of the Immigration Service, in these cases, has seemed
to be revenge; revenge for a fancied wrong done the state by the alien
who becomes a charge upon public facilities, or who breaches the immi-
gration laws willy-nilly or inadvertently. And although here and there
judges decide causes in what from the laic point of view is a common
sense way, many either wring their hands in written lament and im-
plore the Department of Labor not to be mean, or grimly go through
with the job of setting their seals upon draconic, literal, and unplanned
enforcement of irrational immigration measures. It is said that the Immi-
gration Service and the Department of Labor within the past six years
have become more humane. Perhaps so. Certainly there have been marked
changes for the better. The Department no longer merits calumny. But
the laws on the books are still the same. Those statutes need a thorough
and reasoned overhauling in view of present national and world-wide
societal phenomena.
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